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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in its very attempt to foster neutrality, the
Court has taken a side? Doesn't it appear
that in attempting to accommodate all re-
ligions, the Court has favored the few? And
while we need not fear a raging torrent of
Recent Decision:
With All Deliberate Speed-
A Changing Concept
In Desegregation
But a State cannot be expected to move with
the celerity of a private business man; it is
enough if it proceeds in the language of the
English Chancery with all deliberate speed.'
Petitioners commenced this action against
the City of Memphis seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief directing the immedi-
ate desegregation of those recreational fa-
cilities from which Negroes were being
excluded. The City did not deny that the
facilities were being operated on a segre-
gated basis, but defended on the ground that
a delay was required in order to effectuate
desegregation without violence and hostility.
The district court, relying on Brown v.
Board of Educ. [hereinafter referred to as
the Brown decree] which had allowed de-
lay in the desegregation of public schools
under certain conditions, denied petitioner's
relief and ordered the City to submit a plan
providing for the desegregation of the rele-
vant facilities with deliberate speed. Having
granted certiorari, the Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the City had failed to
bring itself within the purview of the Brown
decree since desegregation in public recrea-
' Virginia v. West Virginia, 122 U.S. 17, 19-20
(1911).
2349 U.S. 294 (1955).
control by the secularists, doesn't it appear
that in attempting to stop the "trickling
stream of breached neutrality," the Supreme
Court has actually created a steady stream
of support for non-theistic religions?
tional facilities did not involve the difficulties
justifying delay which were inherent in
school desegregation. Watson v. City of
Memphis, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4498 (U.S. May
27, 1963).
The Brown decree was the implementa-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision in the
first Brown case which held that since sepa-
rate educational facilities were inherently
unequal, racial segregation by the states in
their public school facilities was prohibited
by the fourteenth amendment.3 The decree
afforded considerable leeway in the manner
and speed with which desegregation was to
be effectuated. Recognizing that school de-
segregation involved serious administrative
problems, the Court vested primary re-
sponsibility for their solution in the local
school authorities. The federal district
courts were to consider whether or not the
actions of the local school boards consti-
tuted a "good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles."4 While
these governing principles were not to be
sacrificed merely because of disagreement
3Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
While the Courf relied on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, in Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), it was held that
segregation in the District of Columbia's public
schools constituted a deprivation of due process
under the fifth amendment.
4Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299
(1955).
with them, the "public interest" might per-
mit some delay. The burden of establishing
any need for delay was on the local school
authorities. The district courts were to re-
tain jurisdiction during the transitional
period, thereby hopefully insuring that de-
segregation would be brought about with
all deliberate speed.
The Brown decree recognized essentially
five administrative problems which might
justify delay in desegregation: physical
condition of the school plant, school trans-
portation system, personnel, revision of
school districts, and revision of local laws
and regulations.5 Despite the Brown decree,
the district courts have held that these ad-
ministrative difficulties would not excuse
the failure of a school board to submit a
plan.0 In addition, since the administrative
difficulties enumerated are not as severe in
higher levels of education as in public ele-
mentary and secondary school systems, the
Court has been unwilling to allow any delay
in this area and has ordered immediate ad-
mission to the schools in question.'
Beyond these decisions there has been
great diversity among the district courts as
to the weight to be given to the factors
which would warrant delay. Part of this
diversity can be accounted for by the fact
that, in each case, the question of deliberate
speed was decided with reference to the
existing local conditions." However, the
major problem in this area appears to be
5 Id. at 300-01.
6 Evans v. Members of State Bd. of Educ., 149
F. Supp. 376 (D. Del. 1957). See also Dove v.
Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504, 519 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350
U.S. 413 (1956). For a thorough discussion of the
legal sanctions available to enforce desegregation,
see Note, 65 YALE. L.J. 630 (1956).
8 Kelly v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 225 (6th
Cir. 1959).
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the varying opinions concerning the correct
weight to be given to the factor of public
hostility as an excuse for delay. This ques-
tion was not apparently answered by the
Brown decree, for although the Court stated
that hostility alone could not prevent ul-
timate enforcement, it did not indicate
whether hostility could justify a delay.
While some courts and commentators
have rejected public hostility or racial ten-
sions as factors to be considered, 9 others
have placed direct reliance on hostile com-
munity attitudes in order to justify delay. 10
Thus, in Bush v. Orleans Parish School
Bd.11 the court enjoined segregation but in-
dicated that:
The problems attendant desegregation in the
deep South are considerably more serious
than generally appreciated in some sections
of our country. The problem of changing a
people's mores, particularly those with an
emotional overlay is not to be taken lightly.'12
Cooper v. Aaron1 3 is distinguished from
these cases in that the hostility here was
not advanced to justify delay in the formu-
lation of a plan, since a plan for gradual
integration had already been approved.
Rather, the school was attempting to gain
additional delay due to the racial outbreaks
that occurred at Little Rock when integra-
"School Bd. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir.
1958); Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956); McKay, With
All Deliberate Speed, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991,
1088-90 (1956). See Clemons v. Board of Educ.,
228 F.2d 853, 859 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 925 (1952).
10 Davis v. County School Bd., 149 F. Supp. 431
(E.D. Va. 1957). See also Evans v. Members of
State Bd. of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Del.
1957); Moore v. Board of Educ., 146 F. Supp. 91,
95 (D. Md. 1956).
11 138 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (E.D. La. 1956).
12 Ibid.
13 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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tion was enforced. The Court here termed
hostility as "irrelevant"'' 4 in deciding
whether conditions would justify delaying
immediate desegregation. The concurring
opinion emphasized this rationale by stating
that permitting hostility to delay the en-
forcement of an existing decree would
"enthrone official lawlessness." '" However,
this case did not decide whether plans al-
lowing for delay in order to soothe com-
munity opinion were within the purview of
the Brown decree.
Although the majority of the decisions
have not relied directly on public hostility
as a ground for delay, many decisions mani-
fest by implication that hostile community
attitudes should be taken into account. The
enumerated administrative difficulties of the
Brown decree do not involve a long time
lag,"; but yet some courts have accepted
delays in public school integration ranging
as high as twelve years.' 7 In addition the
courts have, by deferring to the school
boards' discretion, recognized at least im-
pliedly the factor of community hostility.
This deference can occur when a court
refuses to interfere with the school boards'
action upon a finding that a "reasonable"
effort at desegregation has been initiated.ls
It also occurs when a school board has
failed to formulate a plan, and a court, in
lieu of an order compelling the submission
'4 Id. at 7.
1: Id. at 22.
" McKay, With All Deliberate Speed, 31 N.YU.L.
REV. 991, 1088 (1956).
'7 For cases involving long delays, see, e.g., Allen
v. County School Bd., 164 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Va.
1958); Kelly v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272
(M.D. Tenn. 1958); Moore v. Board of Educ.,
152 F. Supp. 114 (D. Md. 1957); Aaron v. Cooper,
143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), afi'd, 243
F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957).
18 See Kelly v. Board of Educ., 2 RACE REL. L.
REP. 21, 24 (M.D. Tenn. 1957).
of a plan, has granted an injunction against
segregation couched in general terms.' 9 This
injunction merely reaffirms the duty of the
local officials to desegregate the public
schools with almost complete discretion
being left to the school boards as to the
time required to fulfill this responsibility.
Since the school officials are peculiarly
susceptible to local public opinion, it is not
unreasonable to assume that in framing
their action, they have given due weight
to possible violence. Indeed, some school
boards have stated directly that local senti-
ment is to be considered in determining how
and when integration should be accom-
plished.2-
In the area of public recreation, although
some doubt had originally existed as to
whether the doctrine of "separate but
equal" was applicable, '21 it was soon settled
that the Brown decision was not limited in
its scope to education but also prohibited
state enforced segregation of recreational
facilities."2 In general, little discussion arose
it) This type of injunction typically paraphrases the
language of the Brown decree and orders that
admission to schools must take place on a non-
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. E.g.,
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. La. 1956); Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F.
Supp. 776 (E.D. S.C. 1955). Contra, Evans v.
Members of State Bd. of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 376
(D. Del. 1957); Banks v. Izzard, 1 RACE REL. L.
REP. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
"0 Statement of Chattanooga Board of Education,
I RACE REL. L. REP 607 (1956). For an expres-
sion of a similar viewpoint by a legislative body,
see Report of the Legal and Legislative Subcom-
inittee of the Texas Advisory Committee on
Segregation in the Public Schools, I RACE REL.
L. REP. 1077 (1956).
,- McKay, Segregation and Public Recreation, 40
VA. L. REV. 697 (1954).
22 Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), afl'd, 350 U.S. 877
(1955); Simkins v. City of Greensboro, 149 F.
Supp. 562 (M.D.N.C.), afi'd, 246 F.2d 425 (4th
Cir. 1957).
on the question of deliberate speed, the
courts merely issued immediate injunctions
against continued segregation.- In Cum-
mings v. City of Charleston2 however, the
district court granted a delay of eight
months for the desegregation of a munici-
pally-owned golf course since the city anti-
cipated difficulties in "adjusting" to the
court order. The court of appeals modified
the order by holding that the same admin-
istrative problems which justify delay in
education were not present here. 25
There is other opinion writing which
would seem to indicate that the courts have
at least considered the Brown decree in
framing their mandates. In Holly v. City
of Portsmouth,-6 the court refused to sup-
plement its temporary injunction against
segregation at a municipally-owned golf
course with a permanent injunction, stating
that the passage of time would result in
the solution of many of the problems. The
factor of public hostility,2 7 or the possi-
bility that a city would close its recreational
facilities if immediate integration were
ordered,2-' has also been a consideration in
the decisions where the Brown decree was
influential.
The opinion in the instant case sharply
23 Watson v. City of Memphis, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
4498 (U.S. May 27, 1963). E.g., City of St. Peters-
burg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956);
Moorehead v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 152 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D. Fla.), afl'd, 248 F.2d 544 (5th
Cir. 1957); Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379
(E.D. Tex. 1955).
2-1 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 1137, 1139 (E.D.S.C.
1960), modified, 288 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1961).
2 5Cummings v. City of Charleston, 288 F.2d 817
(4th Cir. 1961).
26) 150 F. Supp. 6, 9 (E.D. Va. 1957).
27 Augustus v. City of Pensacola, I RACE REL. L.
REP. 681 (N.D. Fla. 1956).
2s E.g. City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d
364 (1963).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1963
confines the Brown decree to public educa-
tion by indicating that the administrative
problems present in school desegregation
are not present in public recreation. The
Court finds that the City of Memphis has
failed to sustain the extremely heavy bur-
den of proof required to justify delay.2)
The implication is that integration in all
public recreational facilities must take place
immediately.
Since education is required by state law,
whereas no one is compelled to take ad-
vantage of the public recreational facilities,
the element of public hostility is far less
severe in the recreational area." In addi-
tion, it may well be that education, in
contrast to public recreation, has acquired
a far more unique position in the public
mind."' Finally, the more burdensome ad-
ministrative problems in the area of educa-
tion also justify the distinction which the
Court has drawn by limiting the appli-
cability of the Brown decree to public
education.
The Court denied the City's claim that
delay was required in order to avoid vio-
lence with language strongly indicating that
the administrative factors enumerated in
the Brown decree were the only legitimate
reasons for delay. In asserting that the
"best guarantee of civil peace is adherence
to, and respect for, the law, ' '13 2 the Court
indicated that violence was not to be a
legitimate excuse for delay, whether it was
advanced in recreation or education. Public
hostility cannot be asserted to delay the
implementation of an already existing or-
'-', Watson v. City of Memphis, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
4498, 4500 (U.S. May 27, 1963).
:11 McKay, supra note 21, at 724.
*'I See Murphy, Desegregation in Public Education,
15 MD. L. REV. 221, 232 (1955).
32 See note 29 supra, at 4501.
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der, or to justify the placing of a plan of
long delay before a court. Not only will
this decision end any affirmative reliance by
the district courts on hostility as a basis
for delay, but it will also reach any implied
condonations such as those mentioned pre-
viously. Acceptance of plans calling for
long periods of transition, before desegre-
gation can be effectuated, will no longer
be justified if the courts eliminate the pos-
sibility of hostility as a factor excusing
delay.
The hope that a lengthy period of tran-
sition would lessen community opposition
has not been fulfilled. The actions in
Alabama seven years after Little Rock
are reflective of a continuing hostility to
desegregation. It has not been shown that
lengthy periods of delay are more effective
than immediate integration. Recently, de-
segregation in recreational facilities has
occurred without delay or incident.33 In
education, one study has indicated that pro-
longed efforts to integrate public schools
are less effective in reducing racial tension
than a clear-cut policy executed with firm
resolution. 4
The Court, however, goes beyond the
immediate issues of the principal case and
re-examines the Brown decree in the light
of present-day conditions. The Brown de-
cree was written at a time when the Court's
decision that racial segregation was viola-
tive of the fourteenth amendment was a
radical departure from the past. The decree,
therefore, allowed for a period of "adjust-
ment." As a result, many states, rather
than attempting good faith implementations
33 N. Y. Times, June 14, 1963, p. 19, col. I (city
ed.).
a4 McKay, With All Deliberate Speed, 31 N.YU.L.
REV. 991, 1008 (1956).
of the decree, have instead developed
tactics designed to delay desegregation. The
methods used to delay integration have
included the doctrine of nullification, the
closing of the schools as they are ordered
desegregated, various school transfer sys-
tems, public aid to "private" schools, and
the gerrymandering of districts in order to
place Negroes in the same schools.:" In the
area of public recreation, the more com-
mon methods of avoidance have been the
selling or closing of the facilities.-",!
In addition, the attitude of the Negro in
1963 is vastly different from that in 1955.
In 1955, a decree allowing for equitable
delay in implementing desegregation, was
somewhat acceptable to a race that had
waited many years for the recognition of
the right to attend integrated schools. To-
day, the same patience is understandably
absent; the sit-ins and the demonstrations
are indicative of a growing dissatisfaction
with delay, and demand that desegregation
occur in the present.
In light of these developments, the stand-
ard of deliberate speed which was accept-
able in the past is no longer acceptable
today. While, previously, "gradualism" may
have been a proper form of compliance with
the Brown decree, far more promptness in
desegregation will be required today in
order to satisfy the new standard of deli-
berate speed. "The basic guarantees of our
:1 For a thorough discussion of the methods em-
ployed to defeat or delay desegregation, see
McKay, Witi All Deliberate Speed-Legislative
Reaction and Judicial Development 1956-1957+,
43 VA. L. REV. 1205 (1957); Note, 54 Nw. U.L.
REV. 354 (1959).
:;Generally, the courts will not enjoin a state
either from making a bona fide sale or from clos-
ing the recreational facilities ordered to be inte-
grated; See Survey, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 995, 997-
99 (1962).
 
